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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
DARRILL GORDY : Case No. 20000661 -CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), which authorizes this Court to review appeals that the Utah 
Supreme Court transfers to this Court. 
ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION 
The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution requires trial courts to suppress 
unreliable eyewitness identification testimony. The eyewitness in this case viewed the 
assailant for a few seconds before being attacked; the witness was distracted by a loud 
alarm, her fright, and her concerns for her safety; she was not wearing her glasses; she 
identified Appellant at a blatantly suggestive show-up; and the assailant was a different 
race than the witness. Did the trial judge err in refusing to suppress the identification? 
In reviewing the admission of eyewitness identifications, this Court reverses the 
trial court's findings of facts if they are against the clear weight of the evidence and 
reviews its reliability determination for correctness. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991). Trial counsel contested the eyewitness identification in a motion to suppress 
and at a hearing on the motion. R. 172; 253: 23-36.1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
Article One, section seven of the Utah Constitution protects individuals5 right to 
due process of law: ffNo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 16, 1999, the State filed an Information charging Appellant Darrill Gordy 
with aggravated burglary, robbery, possession of burglary tools, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. R. 20. The trial court conducted a jury trial on January 19, 20, and 21, 
2000. R. 250-52.2 The jury convicted Mr. Gordy of the drug paraphernalia charge but 
could not reach a verdict on the remaining charges. R. 252: 294-300. The trial judge 
Volume 253 contains the transcript of a pretrial hearing on several motions. The 
internal page numbers of that volume are included after "R. 253." 
2
 Volumes 250 through 252 contain the transcript of the first trial. The internal 
page numbers of those volumes are included after "R.,f and the volume number. 
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excused the jury and scheduled the case for a new trial. R. 252: 300-303. 
On April 24, 2000, Mr. Gordy filed a motion to suppress the victim's eyewitness 
identification testimony. R. 172. The State opposed the motion. R. 181. The trial judge 
conducted a hearing on the motion and denied Mr. Gordy's request. R. 253: 34-36. 
The trial judge convened a second jury trial on May 17, and 18, 2000. R. 255-57.3 
The jury convicted Mr. Gordy of the remaining charges. R. 248. On July 3, 2000, the 
trial judge sentenced Mr. Gordy to concurrent terms of five years to life for aggravated 
burglary, one to 15 years for robbery, and 180 days for possession of burglary tools. R. 
230-31; Addendum. Mr. Gordy filed a timely notice of appeal on July 26, 2000. R. 233. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS4 
During the evening of June 12, 1999, 69-year old Joyce Gaffney was watching 
television in the bedroom of her home located at approximately 900 West and 1100 South 
in Salt Lake City. R. 251: 111-13, 125. Although Ms. Gaffiiey sees objects well that are 
more than 10 to 12 feet away, she cannot read without using the bottom half of her 
bifocals. R. 251: 117-18. She uses the top half of her bifocals "for the distance between 
the far off and reading" such as reading price tags on the bottom shelf at the grocery store. 
3Volumes 255-57 contain the transcript of the second trial. The internal page 
numbers of those volumes are included after "R." and the volume number. 
4Because the trial judge admitted the eyewitness identification based on the 
evidence presented at the first trial, the facts are taken from that proceeding. R. 253: 25. 
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R. 251: 118, 140. Without glasses, Ms. Gaffney has ffto get down on [her] knees in order 
to read the prices." R. 251: 140. 
As Ms. Gaffney watched television, her security system sounded. R. 251: 113-14. 
Because it was a warm day, Ms. Gaffney had opened some of her windows to let in air. 
R. 251: 114-15. The security system employed sensors on the windows that, if touched, 
would trigger the alarm even if a window were open. R. 251: 115. 
After the alarm sounded, Ms. Gaffney saw a person streak past the hallway into the 
living room. R. 251: 116. Ms. Gaffiiey got up from her bed and walked toward the living 
room where she saw an African-American man from about 20 feet away looking out of 
her peep hole with his back to her. R. 251: 116-17. Ms. Gaffney is Caucasion. R. 255: 
132. The lighting in the house was good and Ms. Gaffney could clearly see the man 
without her glasses. R. 251: 117-18. 
When Ms. Gaffiiey asked the man why he was in her home, he turned around and 
f,[m]ade a mad dash" toward her. R. 251: 119, 141. Ms. Gaffney claimed that when the 
man turned around she paid particular attention to his face. R. 251: 136, 150. Upon 
reaching her, the man immediately began to push Ms. Gaffney backwards. R. 251: 120. 
The man pushed her five or six times and as he did so each time he demanded, "Money, 
bitch!" R. 251: 119-20. Ms. Gaffney tried to keep her balance and fell to one knee but 
she did not fall down. R. 251: 120-21. Because she was concerned for her safety, she did 
not pay much attention to the man. R. 251: 142. Ms. Gaffney repeatedly pushed the man 
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back and screamed that she had no money. R. 251: 120-21. 
The man pushed Ms. Gaffney into the bedroom and entered the room. R. 251: 
121-22. Ms. Gaffney did not Mwatch[] to see what he did." R. 251:122. Instead, she 
"made a mad dash for the kitchen door." R. 251: 122. When Ms. Gaffney was three-
fourths out of the kitchen door the man met her and tried to pin her against the door to 
prevent her from leaving. R. 251: 123. Despite the man's efforts, Ms. Gaffney squeezed 
out the door into the back yard. R. 251: 123-24. 
The man followed and pushed Ms. Gaffney into the garage. R. 251: 123-24. Ms. 
Gaffney also noticed that the man had taken her purse and had strewn the contents 
throughout the house and into the yard. R. 251: 124. The man dropped the purse, jumped 
over a fence, and ran east along some railroad tracks that crossed the Jordan River. R. 
251: 124-26. The man held nothing else in his hands during the crime. R. 251: 143-44. 
Ms. Gaffney was ffso frightened and upset" that she didn't know what to do 
following the attack. R. 251: 127, 146. Because she "wasn't thinking too clearly," she 
stood in her yard and screamed for someone to call the police instead of doing so herself. 
R. 251: 146. A young man walked by with a small child and admonished Ms. Gaffney to 
call the police. R. 251: 146. Ms. Gaffney followed the man's advice and called 911. R. 
251: 146. 
Because Ms. Gaffney was so distraught, she did not know how much time elapsed 
before the police arrived. R. 251: 127, 146. She guessed that several minutes went by 
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because she spoke with the 911 operator for a while before the police arrived. R. 251: 
127. In contrast, the police officer who responded to the call reported arriving within 20 
seconds because he was only a block away. R. 251: 159. Throughout the incident, the 
security alarm continued to ring. R. 251: 127. 
Ms. Gaffney described the assailant as African-American, six-feet tall, slim build, 
"mean" eyes, having a goatee, and wearing a plaid shirt and a baseball hat turned 
backwards. R. 251: 136-37, 172-73; 253: 24. He had apparently placed a chair under the 
kitchen window, cut the window screen on three corners, and crawled through the 
window. R.251: 128-29. 
Several police officers converged on the area where Ms. Gaffney saw the assailant 
fleeing. R. 251: 201-02. Within 15 or 20 minutes after the radio report, Police Officer 
Tracy Ita approached the area in his car driving south on 900 West. R. 251: 169-70, 195-
97. When he reached 800 South, he saw Mr. Gordy walking out of a small park along the 
Jordan River Parkway. R. 251: 170-72, 190. Mr. Gordy basically matched the 
description of the assailant except he wore a solid colored shirt instead of a plaid one and 
he was carrying a blue Nike duffel bag. R. 251: 170-75; Exhibit 6. Mr. Gordy saw 
Officer Ita approaching but he made no attempt to flee. R. 251: 198. 
The park was located a few blocks west of Ms. Gaffney's residence on the east 
side of the Jordan River. R. 251: 163, 184. A bridge crosses the river along the railroad 
tracks that run next to Ms. Gaffney's house. R. 251: 184. A path leads from the bridge to 
6 
the park. R. 251: 184-92. According to Officer Ita, the only other people in the park 
were a Native American couple. R. 251: 175. 
Officer Ita detained Mr. Gordy and observed that sweat was dripping from Mr. 
Gordy5s face. R. 251: 174, 176. Officer Ita did not see Mr. Gordy running nor did Mr. 
Gordy appear to be out of breath. R. 251: 175, 177. Mr. Gordy fully cooperated with 
Officer Ita. R. 251: 198. After searching Mr. Gordy, Officer Ita found a gold watch in 
one hand, and a small pocket knife in the other. R. 251: 178. The duffel bag contained 
another smaller duffel bag which held 30 compact discs, a marijuana pipe, a crack pipe, a 
spoon with burn marks, a copper filter, knit gloves, and a screwdriver. R. 251: 178-82, 
199. 
The police transported Ms. Gaffney to the park for a show-up identification. R. 
251: 163. The police informed Ms. Gaffney that they had located a "possible suspect.11 
R. 251: 148, 163. When Ms. Gaffney arrived at the park, Mr. Gordy was handcuffed, 
standing next to several police officers and patrol cars with his back to Ms. Gaffney. R. 
251: 137, 148. Ms. Gaffney remained in the police car and observed Mr. Gordy from six 
to seven feet away. R. 251: 137-38. The record does not indicate whether Ms. Gaffney 
wore her glasses at the time of the show-up. When the police turned Mr. Gordy around, 
Ms. Gaffney identified him as the assailant. R. 251: 138. 
The State charged Mr. Gordy with aggravated burglary, robbery, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, and possession of burglary tools. R. 20. Two days after his arrest, 
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Mr. Gordy waived his Miranda rights and spoke with a police detective. R. 251: 219; 
Exhibit 18. Mr. Gordy denied any involvement in the crime and explained instead that he 
was homeless and had been in the park for one two hours before his arrest with another 
person who he referred to as a male . R. 251: 219-20, 227; Exhibit 18. He declined to 
name his companion because an outstanding warrant was pending for that person. R. 
251: 227. Mr. Gordy stated further that he had been running before his arrest. R. 251: 
221. 
The trial court conducted a jury trial on the charges on January 19 through 21, 
2000. R. 250-52. Mr. Gordy defended the charges by claiming that given the problems 
with eyewitness identification Ms. Gaffney's show-up identification was not reliable. R. 
252: 268-75. The jury convicted Mr. Gordy of possession of drug paraphernalia but 
failed to reach a verdict on the remaining charges. R. 252: 298-300. The trial judge 
declared a mistrial and scheduled a new trial. R. 252: 300-02. 
On April 24, 2000, Mr. Gordy filed a motion to suppress Ms. Gaffney's 
eyewitness identification. R. 172. Mr. Gordy argued that the factors limiting the 
reliability of eyewitness identification demanded suppressing Ms. Gaffney's 
identification testimony. These factors included her brief opportunity to view the 
assailant, her fear and concern for her safety, the cross-racial aspect of the identification, 
her poor eyesight, her description of the assailant's shirt as plaid, and the suggestiveness 
of the show-up. R. 176-78; 253: 26-29. Mr. Gordy also gave notice of his intent to admit 
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expert testimony on the limitations of eyewitness identification. R. 161. The State 
opposed the motion to suppress and filed a motion in limine to preclude the expert 
testimony. R. 181, 185; 253: 31-34. 
The trial judge held a motion hearing on May 8,2000. R. 253. Instead of 
presenting evidence, the parties and the trial judge agreed to rely on the pleadings and the 
evidence presented at the first trial. R. 253: 25. The trial judge allowed Mr. Gordy to 
present the expert testimony, but, denied his motion to suppress the show-up 
identification. R. 253: 22, 34. The judge reasoned that the show-up occurred shortly 
after the crime. R. 253:34-35. He found further that Ms. Gaffney had a sufficient 
opportunity to observe the assailant because she paid attention to the man's face when he 
turned around in the living room. R. 253: 35. The judge also found that Ms. Gaffney had 
another opportunity to view the assailant when the man pushed her "slowly" and "was 
saying words to her" in the hallway. R. 253: 35. 
In further support, the trial judge concluded that Ms. Gaffney was a credible 
witness and that she had good mental acuity. R. 253: 34-35. He noted that Ms. Gaffney's 
testimony remained consistent and that "she was pretty positive" in her identification. R. 
253: 35. Although Ms. Gaffney did not accurately describe Mr. Gordy's shirt, the judge 
found that Mr. Gordy could have changed clothes in the park and that, in any event, this 
discrepancy was minor. R. 253: 34-35. Finally, the judge reasoned that he would instruct 
the jury on the limitations of eyewitness identifications and that Mr. Gordy was "getting 
9 
the benefit of the expert coming in and showing where there are occasions where 
[eyewitness identifications and show-ups] aren't reliable " R. 253: 36. 
The trial judge convened the second jury trial on May 17 and 18, 2000. R. 255-57. 
Ms. Gaffney repeated her version of the facts but several discrepancies arose in her 
testimony.5 In addition, Merri Ann June testified for the defense that she was the alibi 
witness that Mr. Gordy referred to in his interview with the police two days after his 
arrest. R. 256: 9-10. Ms. June claimed that she had been with Mr. Gordy in the park for 
an hour before his arrest except for a five or ten minute interval when Mr. Gordy used the 
park restroom. R. 256: 9-12. On cross-examination, Ms. June testified that neither she 
nor Mr. Gordy had been running while in the park. R. 256: 17. She also could not 
explain why she had not come forward previously even though she had resolved all 
outstanding warrants before the first trial and had even attended that proceeding. R. 256: 
25-27. During the State's rebuttal case, Officer Ita testified that Ms. June was not in the 
park at the time of Mr. Gordy's arrest. R. 256: 30. 
The jury convicted Mr. Gordy on the remaining charges. R. 257: 4-8. The trial 
judge sentenced Mr. Gordy to concurrent terms of five years to life for aggravated 
specifically, Ms. Gaffney claimed for the first time that the assailant had braided 
hair, even though Mr. Gordy's was not. R. 255: 107, 165; Exhibit 6. Contrary to her 
description of the 911 operator that the assailant wore a nplaid" shirt, Ms. Gaffney 
claimed that the man's shirt was blue and white. R. 255: 107, 127. Her description of the 
shirt as blue also failed to match Mr. Gordy's shirt which was solid black. R. 255: 127, 
164. 
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burglary, one to 15 years for robbery, and 180 days for possession of burglary tools. R. 
230-31. He also imposed a $15,000 fine, a surcharge of $6,891.89, and ordered Mr. 
Gordy to pay $300 toward the cost of his court-appointed attorneys. R. 232. This appeal 
followed. R. 233. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Before admitting eyewitness identification testimony, the Utah Constitution 
requires trial judges to determine that the evidence is reliable. Ms. Gaffney's show-up 
identification fails to satisfy constitutional standards. Ms. Gaffney viewed the assailant 
for, at most, a few seconds while a loud alarm sounded throughout the encounter. Rather 
than focusing on the assailant, Ms. Gaffney was primarily concerned with protecting 
herself, keeping her balance, and escaping. She was also admittedly frightened 
throughout and following the encounter which caused her to lose track of time and 
neglect to even call the police. Ms. Gaffney could not clearly view the assailant because 
she did not wear her glasses during the attack and, except for one brief glimpse, she 
viewed the assailant within the range of her visual impairment. There is also no 
indication that Ms. Gaffney had her glasses at the show-up even though she identified Mr. 
Gordy within her range of her visual defect. The show-up itself was blatantly suggestive. 
And, finally the assailant was a different race than Ms. Gaffney. Under these facts, Ms. 
Gaffney's identification was unreliable. 
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The record contradicts the trial judge's findings in support of his admission of Ms. 
Gaffney's identification testimony. Contrary to the trial judge's findings, Ms. Gaffney 
had only one clear, glimpse of her attacker in the living room that lasted, at most, a few 
seconds. Instead of considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge noted a 
few factors supporting the identification and overlooked the significant problems with 
Ms. Gaffney's opportunity to observe and reliably identify her attacker. The trial judge 
rationalized admitting the identification by giving a jury instruction on the limitations of 
eyewitness identification and allowing expert testimony on that issue. In doing so, the 
judge shirked his gatekeeping duty to determine the reliability of the evidence and he 
delegated that responsibility to the expert, and ultimately to the jury. Because the State 
cannot link Mr. Gordy to the crime absent Ms. Gaffney's unreliable testimony, reversal is 
required. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FACTORS ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
DEMANDED SUPPRESSING THE IDENTIFICATION 
AND ITS ERRONEOUS ADMISSION REQUIRES 
REVERSAL 
The trial judge erred in denying Mr. Gordy's motion to suppress Ms. Gaffney's 
eyewitness identification because it was constitutionally unreliable. In weighing the 
factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification, Ms. Gaffney's identification 
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fell short. The trial judge made many of the same assumptions that the research on 
eyewitness identification rejects and, instead, deferred his reliability determination to the 
expert witness and the jury. Because Ms. Gaffhey's identification lacked reliability and 
its admission harmed the defense, a new trial is needed. 
A. The Identification was Constitutionally 
Unreliable 
Ms. Gaffhey's testimony lacked reliability and was inadmissible. The Utah 
Constitution bars the admission of unreliable eyewitness testimony. State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991). Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
that, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law." This provision requires trial judges to "determine from the totality of the 
circumstances whether the admission of [eyewitness] identification is consistent" with 
due process guarantees. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. Due process demands that trial 
courts must "determine, as a threshold matter, whether the identification is 
constitutionally reliable and thus, whether it can be properly admitted into evidence." 
State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, ^ 16, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
In making these determinations, trial courts must consider the following factors: 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during 
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
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consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and 
relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the 
observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race 
of the actor was the same as the observer's." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
When admitting eyewitness testimony, trial courts must make findings to support their 
decision on the record. See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The State has the burden of establishing the reliability of eyewitness identification 
testimony. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778; Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943. 
In applying these principles, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper," preventing 
constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification evidence from going to the jury. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778; see also Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944. This gatekeeper role is 
premised on conclusive empirical data that establish the fallibility of such evidence; 
specifically, jurors' unfamiliarity with the inherent weaknesses of human recall, their 
tendency to give eyewitness identification undue weight, and the resulting potential for 
"erosion of constitutional guarantees." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-80 (citing Long, 721 
P.2d at 488-90 (discussing weaknesses of memory)). 
The factors outlined in Ramirez demand suppression of Ms. Gaffney's 
identification. First, Ms. Gaffney had little opportunity to view the assailant. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 782. Specifically, she had a minimal "length of time" to view the assailant's 
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face because she was primarily concerned for her safety. LI Although Ms. Gaffney paid 
attention to the man's face when he turned around in the living room, this view lasted, at 
most, a few seconds. Ms. Gaffney explained that upon turning around, the man "made a 
mad dash" towards her and "immediately" shoved her. R. 251: 119, 141. Ms. Gaffney 
admitted further that during the scuffle she did not pay attention to the man because she 
was more concerned for her safety and avoiding falling over backwards. R. 251: 142. 
Once the man pushed Ms. Gaffney into the bedroom, he immediately entered the 
room and Ms. Gaffney quickly fled for the kitchen door. She next saw the man as he 
tried to pin her against the door. But, Ms. Gaffney could not have had a good view of 
the assailant at this point because the door blocked her view of him and she was intent on 
escaping. 
The only other opportunity for Ms. Gaffney to see the man's face occurred after 
she squeezed out the door. But, according to Ms. Gaffney, the man pushed her into the 
garage and fled along the railroad tracks with his back to her. Because pushing her into 
the garage would be most distracting, Ms. Gaffney had little chance to observe the man 
before he fled out of sight. At most, Ms. Gaffney saw the assailant's face for a few short 
seconds outside her house. 
Not only did the pushing and Ms. Gaffney's efforts to maintain her balance impair 
her opportunity to view the assailant, but the "distracting noise[]" caused by the security 
alarm affected Ms. Gaffhey's observations. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. The security 
15 
alarm rang throughout the entire incident. R. 251: 127. As Ms. Gaffney agreed at the 
second trial, the alarm was "loud" and "obnoxious." R. 255: 120. 
The second Ramirez factor addresses the "degree of attention" the witness paid to 
the actor. 817 P.2d at 783. Again, although Ms. Gaffney claimed that she specifically 
observed the assailant's face in the living room, her attention quickly turned to protecting 
herself from the blows and from falling over backwards. Likewise, at the kitchen door, 
Ms. Gaffney's only concern was to escape her assailant. Once outside, Ms. Gaffney 
again had to protect herself from the assailant's push into the garage. She also stated that 
she focused her attention during some of this time on the contents of her purse that the 
man had strewn throughout the house and yard. Thus, Ms. Gaffney divided her attention 
between the contents of her purse, self-protection, and escape. 
The third reliability factor addresses the witness's "capacity to observe the actor 
during the event." LI Relevant considerations include "whether the witness's capacity to 
observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal 
motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, 
drugs, or alcohol." IcL Admittedly, Ms. Gaffney was not influenced by drugs, alcohol, or 
lack of sleep. R. 251: 133-34. Nevertheless, she readily conceded that she was "so 
frightened and upset" that she lacked the presence of mind to call the police. R. 251: 127, 
146. Instead, a passerby had to remind her to do so. 
Her fright also caused her to grossly miscalculate the length of time it took the 
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police to respond. Instead of taking several minutes as she claimed, the police arrived 
within twenty seconds after the 911 call. R. 251: 127, 159. As explained in Long, 
"when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities are 
known to decrease significantly." 721 P.2d at 489. 
Ms. Gaffney's "uncorrected visual defects" further limited her ability to observe 
the assailant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. Although Ms. Gaffiiey sees distances well 
without assistance, she needs glasses to see objects under 10 to 12 feet away such as 
price tags on the bottom shelf at the grocery store. R. 251: 117-18, 140. Given her visual 
limitations, all that can be concluded is that Ms. Gaffiiey got one, brief glimpse of the 
assailant's face. Specifically, the only time Ms. Gaffney saw the assailant beyond 10 to 
12 feet was when she first saw the man 20 feet away as he turned around in the living 
room. The other encounters with the assailant occurred when he was within arm's 
length, including the pushing in the hallway; pinning Ms. Gaffiiey against the kitchen 
door and, shoving her into the garage. Thus, Ms. Gaffney only had a single brief glance 
of the assailant in the living room outside the range of her visual defect. 
The record also fails to indicate whether Ms. Gaffiiey wore her glasses at the 
show-up identification. This question is critical because Ms. Gaffiiey observed Mr. 
Gordy from six to seven feet away, well within the distance she has difficulty seeing. R. 
251: 137-38. Given the absence of information on whether Ms. Gaffney identified Mr. 
Gordy with the help of her glasses, the State failed to meet its burden of proof on this 
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vital issue. See State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah Ct. 1997). 
Fourth, although Ms. Gaffney's identification remained fairly consistent, her claim 
that the assailant wore a plaid shirt failed to match Mr. Gordy's solid-colored shirt. More 
importantly, Ms. Gaffney's show-up identification was a "product of suggestion." 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 783. Before transporting Ms. Gaffney for the show-up, the police 
informed her that they had located a "possible suspect." R. 251: 148. At the show-up, 
Mr. Gordy was handcuffed and surrounded by several police officers and marked patrol 
cars. The obvious message communicated to Ms. Gaffney was that the police believed 
they had apprehended the assailant. The Utah Supreme Court has noted the "blatant 
suggestiveness" of similar show-up identifications. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784. 
Fifth, the cross-racial aspect of the identification limits its reliability. Id. at 781. 
Even assuming that the robbery made a memorable impression upon Ms. Gaffney, it is 
undisputed that cross-racial identifications are less reliable than when persons identify 
members of the same race. Long. 721 P.2d at 489. 
In sum, each of the Ramirez factors undermine the reliability of Ms. Gaffney's 
identification. Under "the totality of the circumstances," the trial judge was 
constitutionally required to suppress the identification. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. 
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B. The Trial Judge's Findings Were Against the 
Clear Weight of the Evidence 
In admitting Ms. Gaffney's identification testimony, the trial judge failed to 
recognize these weaknesses, and, instead, made the same assumptions about eyewitness 
identifications that the scientific literature indisputably rejects. Because the record fails 
to support the judge's actual findings, they "are against the clear weight of the evidence" 
and require reversal. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 782. 
The evidence, folly marshaled and viewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
judge's decision, is "legally insufficient" to support its findings. State v. Decorso, 1999 
UT 57,141, 993 P.2d 837 (appellant bears burden of "marshal[ling] the evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding that [the] identification was reliable and then 
show[ing] that such evidence was legally insufficient to support that finding"), cert, 
denied 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000). Admittedly, Ms. Gaffney identified Mr. Gordy shortly 
after the crime, but, the trial judge erred in finding that she had a sufficient opportunity to 
observe the assailant's face. Although she saw the assailant in the living room, that view 
was quick and influenced by fear. As Ms. Gaffney stated, when the man turned around 
he immediately "made a mad dash" towards her. R. 251: 119. This one clear 
observation, thus, lasted only a brief moment. 
The evidence also failed to support the trial judge's finding that Ms. Gaffney had 
a second opportunity to observe the assailant in the hallway when he "slowly" pushed 
Ms. Gaffney and demanded money. Once the man reached Ms. Gaffney, she was so 
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preoccupied with protecting herself, keeping her balancing and trying to escape that she 
admitted that she did not pay attention to the man. R. 251: 142. Also, Ms. Gaffney 
never mentioned that the man "slowly" pushed her. Rather, she stated that the assailant 
rushed toward her, immediately began to push her, and demand money. R. 251: 119-20. 
In any event, Ms. Gaffney could not have clearly seen the assailant during this part of the 
encounter because she saw him up close without her glasses. 
The trial judge also found that Ms. Gaffney was credible, had good mental acuity, 
and she was "pretty positive" in her identification. R. 253: 34-35. But, the voluminous 
body of research on eyewitness identification shows that credibility and mental acumen 
have little relevance to the reliability of eyewitness identifications. This research "leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that human perception is inexact and that human memory is 
both limited and fallible" even among honest, intelligent persons. Long, 721 P.2d at 488. 
It is, likewise, well-documented that a witness's certainty is not "a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection" and can even be inversely related to reliability. Id at 490; 
see State v. Hoffliine. 2001 UT 4, ^ 16, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. Ms. Gaffiiey's confidence 
in her identification simply holds no sway. R. 251: 35. 
The trial judge also discounted the discrepancy between Ms. Gaffiiey's description 
of the assailant's shirt and Mr. Gordy's clothes. According to the trial judge, Mr. Gordy 
could have changed clothes in the park. Not even a hint of evidence supports this finding. 
Mr. Gordy had no clothes in his duffel bag and the police found no other clothes in the 
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surrounding area including the park. This finding amounts to sheer speculation. 
Although the trial judge correctly noted that the discrepancy in the shirt was just 
one factor, he failed to consider the numerous other concerns that undermine Ms. 
Gaffney's identification. Specifically, he failed to factor Ms. Gaffney's fear and concern 
for her safety, her attempts to keep her balance, her incoherence, the loud security alarm, 
her inability to see objects clearly less than 10 or 12 feet away, her focus on the contents 
that fell from her purse, and the cross-racial element of the identification. Without 
considering "'all the circumstances,'" the trial judge's findings were inadequate. Nelson, 
950 P.2d at 943 (quoting Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 779)). 
Lastly, the trial judge admitted the identification, in part, because he instructed the 
jury on the limitations of eyewitness identifications and he had given Mr. Gordy "the 
benefit of the expert" testifying about those limitations. R. 253: 36. In so rationalizing, 
the trial judge substituted his judgment on the reliability of the identification for the 
expert's testimony. Ramirez requires trial judges "to determine, as a threshold matter, 
whether the identification is constitutionally reliable . . . . " Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, f 16 
(emphasis added). The evidence cannot be admitted unless the trial judge first determines 
that admitting the identification "will not deny the defendant due process." Nelson, 950 
P.2dat943. 
Here, the trial judge "abdicated [his] charge as gatekeeper" of the evidence. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. Expert testimony about the limits of eyewitness identifications 
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does not resolve the threshold inquiry of whether the evidence is constitutionally reliable. 
Rather than making a reliability determination, the judge left "protection of constitutional 
rights to the whim of a jury and . . . abandoned] the courts' responsibility to apply the 
law." Id 
C. Because Only Ms. Gaffney's Identification 
Linked Mr. Gordy to the Crime, the Admission 
of Her Testimony Was Not Harmless Beyond 
a Reasonable Doubt 
The admission of Ms. Gaffhey's identification testimony irreparably harmed the 
defense. When trial court action deprives a defendant of a constitutional right, this Court 
must reverse a conviction unless the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, % 30, 973 P.2d 404. The only evidence linking Mr. Gordy to 
the crime was Ms. Gaffhey's unreliable identification. Mr. Gordy possessed no items 
taken from the apartment, there was no indication that he had any marks or injuries that 
would indicate he was in a scuffle, and the State presented no physical evidence from the 
crime scene to show that Mr. Gordy was ever in the house. Further, although the State 
implied that Mr. Gordy could have used the gloves and screwdriver found in the duffel 
bag to break into Ms. Gaffhey's home, Ms. Gaffney testified that the assailant had 
nothing in his hands at any time during the attack. R. 251: 143-44. 
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The only other facts that even hinted to Mr. Gordy's involvement were his 
admission that he was running in the park and his sweaty appearance when arrested. But, 
this evidence was, at best, inconclusive. The evidence conflicted on whether Mr. Gordy 
had been running. In particular, although sweat dripped from Mr. Gordy's face, he was 
not out of breath. The sweat could have resulted from Mr. Gordy's apparent drug usage 
or his nervousness about being confronted by the police while he possessed drug 
paraphernalia. Moreover, Ms. June claimed that Mr. Gordy was not running. In any 
event, even if Mr. Gordy had been running, there was no evidence, other than Ms. 
Gaffney's troubled identification, that showed that he had been running away from Ms. 
Gaffney's home. This evidence simply fails to overcome the weighty harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard. 
Similarly, the problems with Ms. June's testimony do not link Mr. Gordy to the 
crime. Although Mr. Gordy claimed to the police that his companion in the park was a 
male, Mr. Gordy was obviously concerned about protecting his companion's identity 
based on the outstanding warrant. Regardless, Ms. June's failure to come forward and 
the conflict between Officer Ita's and her claims about her being in the park and merely 
undermine her credibility. Those issues do not, however, connect Mr. Gordy to the 
crime. 
Thus, absent Ms. Gaffney's testimony, the State can only show that Mr. Gordy 
was within a few blocks of a recently committed crime and that he matched several 
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characteristics of the suspect. This case is factually similar to State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 
60, 61 (Utah 1987), in which Kalisz had dropped off a friend at a used car lot and then the 
friend pretended to test drive a car for several hours but actually used it to rob a store. 
Kalisz returned the car to the used car dealer within minutes after the robbery. He also 
lied to the police about taking the friend to the hospital for an appendicitis attack. The 
police found no incriminating evidence on Kalisz, in the car, or in Kalisz's residence to 
connect him to the crime. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that ,![t]he State failed to present any evidence that 
placed Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in the getaway car or linked him to the crime 
through possession of any of the stolen goods.1' Id. The Court also dismissed the State's 
claim that Kalisz transported the friend to and from the robbery. Instead, the Court 
concluded that ff[t]he circumstantial evidence connecting Kalisz to [the friend] and the 
crime is insufficient to prove that Kalisz was" involved in the robbery. 
The State similarly failed to link Mr. Gordy to the robbery below. Absent Ms. 
Gaffney's unreliable testimony, the State failed to connect Mr. Gordy to any physical 
evidence. Instead, it can only present circumstantial evidence showing that Mr. Gordy 
may have lied about running, he matched the description of the assailant, and he was near 
the crime scene shortly after its commission. But, like Kalisz, lying and being near the 
scene of a crime are insufficient. In fact, this case presents even stronger grounds for 
reversal because Kalisz's identification was not at issue. 
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Without linking Mr. Gordy to the crime, his conviction cannot stand. As this 
Court has ruled, reversal is required when the trial judge erroneously admits eyewitness 
testimony and the "defendant was convicted primarily upon the testimony of the sole 
eyewitness." Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge admitted unreliable eyewitness testimony that was the sole 
evidence linking Mr. Gordy to the crime, reversal is required. 
SUBMITTED this ^ d a y of March, 2001. 
KENf R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991912260 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: July 3, 2 000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Reporter: EGGERS, BONNIE 
Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 25, 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: video 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 05/18/2000 Guilty 
2. ROBBERY - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 05/18/2000 Guilty 
4. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 01/21/2000 Guilty 
HEARING 
Defendant was transported from the jail for Sentencing. Counsel 
John O'Connell Jr. and Lisa Remal present. 
D ^ ^ r ^ "1 
Case No: 991912260 
Date: Jul 03, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders count 1 and 2 to run concurrent - count 3 is credit 
for time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 
180 day(s). 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Darro 9 
-\ «* I 
Case No: 991912260 
Date: Jul 03, 2000 
SENTENCE FINE 








Charge # 2 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $22 97.3 0 
Due: $5000.00 
Total Fine: $15000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $6891.89 
Total Principal Due: $15000.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Fine is to be supervised through the Board of Pardons. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Dated this /O day of 
DENN&S M. FUCHS 
v/ D i s t r i c t Courts -ijudge 
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